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INTRODUCTION 
Jurors often report experiencing diffi culty in determining the amount of dam-
ages to award in civil trials. Reasons for this diffi culty include the complexity 
of placing a dollar amount on the plaintiff’s injuries and the fact that little or no 
guidance is given in how to award damages (Boswell & Buda, 1996; Broeder, 
1958; Goodman, Greene, & Loftus, 1989; Greene & Bornstein, in press; Wissler, 
Evans, Hart, Morry, & Saks, 1997). When comparative negligence is applied to a 
case, jurors may face an even more diffi cult task. Under comparative negligence 
laws, plaintiffs may be found to be partly responsible for their own injuries. This 
means that the jury must not merely determine liability beyond a certain thresh-
old (e.g., preponderance), but must also decide how responsible each party is. The 
jury then determines a damage award that is supposed to be independent of the li-
ability issue, knowing that this award will be reduced by the court in accordance 
with the degree of negligence attributed to the plaintiff. 
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Two experiments were conducted to ascertain the effects of comparative negligence on 
damage awards. Participants awarded damages for a mock medical malpractice case in 
which the level of the plaintiff’s negligence was varied. Both experiments showed that 
damage awards were doubly discounted for partially negligent plaintiffs. Experiment 1 
also found that the responses of college students did not differ from those of people who 
had been called for jury duty. Experiment 2 examined four components of the damage 
award and showed that the reduction due to the level of the plaintiff’s negligence occurred 
only in damages for bodily harm. Implications for the judicial system are discussed. 
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Comparative Negligence 
Most of the states that have comparative negligence standards adopted them in 
the early 1970s (Shanley, 1985). These standards are now applicable in almost ev-
ery state, as well as in some federal statutes (Schwartz, 1994).1 There are two main 
types of comparative negligence: pure comparative negligence and modifi ed com-
parative negligence. Under the pure form (used by 13 states), a plaintiff may recov-
er damages even if his or her negligence is greater than that of the defendant. Un-
der modifi ed comparative negligence (used by 33 states), the plaintiff may recover 
damages only if his or her negligence is less than 49% (“Wisconsin Rule”) or less 
than or equal to 50% (“New Hampshire Rule”) of that of the defendant. Regardless 
of whether pure or modifi ed comparative negligence is used, the damage award is 
reduced by the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff (Schwartz, 1994). 
Prior to changing to comparative negligence, the standard was (and still is in 
the four states that have not changed) contributory negligence. Under contributo-
ry negligence any negligence by the plaintiff would bar recovery of damages. By 
changing from a contributory to a comparative negligence standard, one would 
expect more decisions for the plaintiff, since it is easier to establish partial fault 
than complete fault. One would also expect smaller average awards, since any 
plaintiff negligence would reduce the award by the amount of the plaintiff’s neg-
ligence. Indeed, a study done by a jury-verdicts reporting service of the fi rst 1,076 
jury trials under the comparative negligence law in Cook County, Illinois, found 
an increase in plaintiff victory rate from roughly 50% to 59%, while the awards 
were reduced by an average of 43% (Shanley, 1985). 
Additionally, Shanley (1985) compared jury verdicts for auto accident cases 
in San Francisco during the period just after the change to comparative negligence 
(1975–1980) to those during the period immediately before the change (1970–1974). 
As expected, the probability of the plaintiff’s winning increased following the change 
to comparative negligence. Furthermore, the gross damage awards for partially neg-
ligent plaintiffs were found to be lower than for comparable nonnegligent plaintiffs. 
Since the gross awards were then reduced by the level of the plaintiff’s negligence 
by the court, the fi nal award would have been reduced twice, or doubly discounted. 
Hammitt, Carroll, and Relles (1985), in examining all the cases tried in Chicago and 
San Francisco from 1960 to 1979, as well as verdicts collected in a nationwide sample 
of auto insurance claims, also found evidence of this double discounting. 
A limitation of these archival studies is that there may be a selection bias, 
such that cases involving comparative negligence claims may have different char-
acteristics from cases not involving comparative negligence. Furthermore, there 
is a lack of control over extraneous variables, such as the size of the ad dam-
num (i.e., the amount requested by the plaintiff), which have been shown to affect 
damage awards in simulation studies (Chapman & Bornstein, 1996; Hinsz & In-
dahl, 1995; Raitz, Greene, Goodman & Loftus, 1990; MacCoun, 1993). 
1 As of 1994, 46 states had adopted some form of comparative negligence. Alabama, Mary-
land, North Carolina, and Virginia are the 4 states that had not changed to a comparative negligence 
standard by 1994. 
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Jury simulations are able to hold such extraneous variables constant, but lit-
tle simulation work has been done which manipulates the degree of plaintiff negli-
gence. Thomas and Parpal (1987), using college students as mock jurors, examined 
liability as a function of plaintiff and defendant fault. They gave each participant 
fi ve fi ctitious case summaries in which they manipulated both the plaintiff’s and 
the defendant’s apparent fault. Participants fi rst rated the responsibility of both the 
plaintiff and the defendant for the harm incurred by the plaintiff, then assessed lia-
bility against the defendant and awarded damages. They found that the rule “liabili-
ty should be proportional to fault” was not an adequate description of the data. They 
did fi nd, however, that apparent fault infl uenced attributions of responsibility, which 
then infl uenced the amount of damages awarded. Hence, they found at least an indi-
rect relationship between the level of comparative negligence and the amount of the 
damage award, but the reductions in the amounts of the awards were not directly 
proportional to the plaintiff’s level of negligence as determined by the participants. 
Feigenson, Park, and Salovey (1997) manipulated the blameworthiness of 
the victim and the severity of the accident across four different case summaries. 
Participants estimated the fault for both the plaintiff and defendant, determined 
a gross damage award, and then determined an adjusted damage award that was 
discounted by the percentage of fault attributed to the plaintiff. They found that 
participants confl ated the issues of liability and damage awards, as indicated by 
both liability and damage awards being affected by legally irrelevant issues (i.e., 
defendant’s blameworthiness affected damage awards, and severity of the plain-
tiff’s injury affected liability judgments). They also found a fairly consistent anti-
plaintiff bias exhibited by reductions in the gross damage awards of more blame-
worthy plaintiffs, leading to double discounting. 
Fusion and Double Discounting 
The above two studies provide initial experimental evidence for the double 
discounting of damage awards of partially negligent plaintiffs. Further, the results 
of these studies are consistent with claims that jurors “fuse” the issues of liability 
and damages (Bornstein, 1998; Greene, 1989; Horowitz & Bordens, 1990; Mac-
Coun, 1993). The question, then, is why do jurors fuse liability and damages? Re-
search on the “hindsight bias” provides one possible explanation. 
The hindsight bias may best be described as the “I knew it all along” phenome-
non. Once the outcome of an event is known (e.g., baseball game, political election, 
medical procedure), people tend to overestimate the likelihood that they would have 
predicted that outcome a priori (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Hawkins 
& Hastie, 1990). In the laboratory, a typical study on the hindsight bias would in-
volve informing some individuals of the outcome of a target event, while with-
holding that outcome information from others. All of the individuals would then 
be asked to estimate the probability of the outcome of the event as if they had not 
received any outcome information. The general fi nding is that individuals receiv-
ing the outcome information estimate the probability of its occurrence signifi cantly 
higher than those not receiving the outcome information (Christensen-Szalanski & 
Willham, 1991; Fischhoff, 1975; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). 
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In a civil trial, particularly personal injury cases, jurors are exposed to out-
come information. An injury has occurred to the plaintiff that has led to a lawsuit. 
While jurors are not asked to make a specifi c probability judgment of the occur-
rence of the injury had they not known the outcome, as would be the case in a typi-
cal hindsight study, they must decide on liability according to the preponderance of 
the evidence, which can be viewed as a type of probability judgment (Saks & Kidd, 
1980). Indeed, although a civil trial is not directly analogous to the typical hindsight 
bias study, other types of psychological phenomena may either share a paradigmat-
ic form with the hindsight bias or involve similar underlying psychological mecha-
nisms (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). In a civil trial, an example of such a phenomenon 
would be the misapplication of jury instructions (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). 
One well-known misapplication of jury instructions involves the instruction 
to ignore inadmissible evidence. Thompson, Fong, and Rosenhan (1981) exam-
ined the impact of inadmissible evidence, which mock jurors were instructed to 
ignore, in a criminal trial. They found that mock jurors who received proacquittal 
inadmissible evidence were less likely to convict than when given proconviction 
inadmissible evidence or no inadmissible evidence. This misapplication of juror 
instructions is not limited to criminal trials. Casper, Benedict, and Perry (1989) 
examined the effect of the hindsight bias on mock jurors’ damage awards in civ-
il suits brought against police offi cers alleged to have engaged in illegal search-
es. They found that information about the outcome of the search (i.e., evidence of 
a crime was or was not found) affected mock jurors’ determination of damages, 
even though the judge instructed them to ignore that information. 
Both of the above studies illustrate that information presented to mock ju-
rors can infl uence their decision making even when they are specifi cally instruct-
ed by the judge to ignore it. They are consistent with other research showing that 
jurors appear to “fuse” different types of judgments, in that information relevant 
to one judgment—such as damages—infl uences another judgment for which it is 
legally irrelevant, such as liability (Bornstein, 1998; Feigenson et al., 1997). De-
termining damages in a comparative negligence case may be likened to the stud-
ies above, in that jurors are instructed to ignore the amount of negligence attribut-
ed to the plaintiff when deciding the gross damage award; that is, participants are 
asked to determine the amount of damages that the plaintiff would have received 
if he or she was not at all responsible for his or her own injuries. However, once 
jurors are aware of any plaintiff contribution to the injuries, studies of the hind-
sight bias and the effect of inadmissible evidence suggest that this information 
will be incorporated into their decision-making processes. 
Experimental Overview 
The present research is an experimental attempt to explore the effects of out-
come information, in the form of information about comparative negligence, on 
damage awards. Because the focus of the present experiments is on how mock ju-
rors apply the instructions concerning comparative negligence in making dam-
age awards, any type of case could have been used. We used a medical malprac-
tice case because (1) much of the ongoing tort reform debate focuses on medical 
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malpractice cases (Vidmar, 1995), (2) a change in recent years in the physician-
patient relationship allows for more patients to contribute to their own injuries 
(Murphy, 1991), and (3) there are limitations to the Thomas and Parpal (1987) 
and Feigenson et al. (1997) studies on comparative negligence. 
Recently tort reform has been a popular issue, particularly regarding medi-
cal malpractice (Litan, 1993; Vidmar, 1995). Some of the issues of contention in-
clude capping damage awards, instituting bifurcated trials, and even replacing juries 
in medical malpractice cases with professional review boards (Daniels & Martin, 
1986; Greene, 1989; Vidmar, 1995). These reform efforts usually include claims 
that juries are overly generous to plaintiffs, thus showing an antidefendant bias. The 
present framework can address whether juries are overly generous to plaintiffs. A 
fi nding of double discounting would indicate that jurors are not overly generous to 
plaintiffs and, if anything, exhibit an antiplaintiff instead of an antidefendant bias. 
A second reason for using a medical malpractice case is in response to a soci-
etal change in the physician-patient relationship such that patients are no longer as-
sumed to be totally unaware of their health care needs (Murphy, 1991). This in-
crease in control over the decision-making process has opened the door for patients 
to contribute negligence, and thus for comparative negligence to be used as a de-
fense. In accordance with this development, the case summary used was taken from 
an actual case (Surgeon ruled liable for hair transplant, 1996) in which comparative 
negligence was used as a defense and the plaintiff was found to be 30% negligent. 
Finally, Thomas and Parpal (1987) did not include a medical malpractice case 
in their study. While Feigenson et al. (1997) did include a medical malpractice case 
and failed to fi nd differences between types of cases, the fi ndings of both studies 
may be clouded because participants determined liability prior to awarding dam-
ages. Further, both studies manipulated the level of plaintiff negligence indirectly 
(i.e., through descriptions of the plaintiff’s behavior). This does not allow for the 
comparison of awards between specifi c levels of plaintiff negligence. Our method-
ology explicitly manipulates the specifi c level of the plaintiff’s negligence, allow-
ing for more direct comparisons across various levels of plaintiff negligence. 
Two experiments were conducted in which participants awarded compen-
sation after reading a case summary in which the level of the plaintiff’s negli-
gence was varied. Three levels of plaintiff negligence were used: 0%, 20%, and 
40%. Of main concern was to determine whether there would be a difference in 
damage awards between nonnegligent plaintiffs and partially negligent plaintiffs 
(i.e., 0% versus 20% and 40%). While the law as written treats the determination 
of negligence and the awarding of damages as independent issues, the fi ndings 
from both archival (Hammitt et al., 1985; Shanley, 1985) and experimental stud-
ies (Feigenson et al., 1997; Thomas & Parpal, 1987) suggest that participants will 
not treat them independently, resulting in lower damage awards to partially neg-
ligent plaintiffs. A secondary issue concerning plaintiff negligence is whether the 
degree of partial negligence has an effect. This issue was addressed by comparing 
two levels of partially negligent plaintiffs (20% vs. 40%). 
In addition to the effects of comparative negligence, there has been interest in 
the strategies that jurors use in determining damages (e.g., Goodman et al., 1989; 
582 ZICKAFOOSEL & BORNSTEIN IN LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 23 (1999)
Greene, 1989; Raitz et al., 1990). An attempt to address this issue was made as 
well, particularly in Experiment 2. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Participants were asked to determine damage awards for a medical malprac-
tice case in which liability had already been established for both the defendant and 
the plaintiff. In a comparative negligence case jurors are instructed to ignore the 
plaintiff’s negligence when determining damages. However, it has been shown that 
jurors are unable to ignore information they have been given, even when instruct-
ed to do so by the judge (Casper et al., 1989; Thompson et al., 1981). Further, it 
has been shown that jurors tend to fuse liability judgments and compensatory dam-
age awards (Bornstein, 1998; Feigenson et al., 1997; Greene, 1989; Horowitz & 
Bordens, 1990). These fi ndings led to the prediction that participants would be un-
able to ignore the level of the plaintiff’s negligence when determining the damage 
award, and would therefore award less to partially negligent plaintiffs. 
In addition, some studies have shown that reductions in the damage awards 
were proportional to fault (Hammitt et al., 1985), while others have not (Thomas 
& Parpal, 1987). This issue was addressed by comparing the 20% and 40% negli-
gence conditions. Due to the confl icting fi ndings cited above, no predictions were 
made concerning the effect of varying the level of partial plaintiff negligence. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 82 introductory psychology students who received extra cred-
it for their participation and 69 people who had been called for jury duty (hereafter re-
ferred to as “jurors”) in either Baton Rouge or Gonzales, Louisiana, who volunteered 
to participate in the study. The demographic makeup was similar for both groups ex-
cept for age (Mdns = 19 and 41 years, respectively). For jurors, 53% were male and 
87% were White; while for students, 41% were male and 80% were White. 
Materials and Design 
A 3 × 2 between-subjects design was used with three levels of plaintiff negli-
gence (0%, 20%, and 40%) and two levels of participant status (students and jurors). 
Each packet contained a summary of a medical malpractice case, the judge’s 
instructions on how to determine damages, and a response sheet.2 
Case Summary. The case summary was adapted from an actual medical malprac-
tice case (Surgeon ruled liable for hair transplant, 1996). After undergoing a series of 
fi ve surgeries for hair transplants, the plaintiff was still losing hair and was left with 
large scars around his face. This sent the plaintiff into a deep depression resulting in a 
failed suicide attempt. The plaintiff claimed that the physician minimized the risks of 
the extensive surgery, and he indicated that had he been aware that the surgery could 
2 A complete copy of the materials may be obtained from the authors. 
DOUBLE DISCOUNTING: EFFECTS OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 583
result in such large scars, he would never have undergone the procedure. The plaintiff 
sued his doctor for not making the risks clear concerning his hair transplant surgery 
and sought compensation for the scars from the surgery itself, injuries from the sui-
cide attempt, lost wages from missed work, and medical costs. Based on pilot testing, 
the amount requested by the plaintiff was set at $50,000. 
The summary included information concerning the cost of the failed surgery 
($15,000), the cost of additional medical expenses ($10,000), the plaintiff’s year-
ly salary ($25,000), and the amount of time the plaintiff had missed from work 
(5 weeks). Yearly salary and time missed from work were both included to allow 
participants to compute lost earnings themselves. 
The summary informed participants (1) that their jury had already found the 
defendant liable for medical malpractice, (2) that the plaintiff had contributed to 
his injuries (either 0%, 20%, or 40%) by not properly educating himself about 
the transplant surgery, and (3) that their only job was to determine how much 
compensation, if any, the plaintiff was to receive from the defendant. For the 0% 
plaintiff negligence condition participants were told that the defense claimed the 
plaintiff was partly responsible for the injuries, but the jury had disagreed and 
found the defendant to be completely responsible. 
Judge’s Instructions. The judge’s instructions were taken from Louisiana 
jury instructions, Volume 11, Civil (Johnson, 1980). The instructions included a 
brief description of what constitutes negligence and how comparative negligence 
is determined. The section concerning comparative negligence indicated that “the 
plaintiff may be partially responsible for his own injuries,” but that the jurors 
were to determine the gross amount of damages incurred by the plaintiff with-
out regard to the plaintiff’s degree of negligence. This amount should “fairly and 
adequately compensate the plaintiff for the damages he has already suffered, and 
that he will in all likelihood suffer in the future.” They were told that this amount 
would then be reduced by the judge according to the level of negligence attribut-
ed to the plaintiff. The judge’s instructions also included examples of what partic-
ipants could award damages for (pain and suffering, medical expenses, lost wag-
es, and bodily harm) and what they were not to consider in determining damages 
(punitive damages, court costs, lawyers’ fees, and taxes on the amount awarded). 
Dependent Variables. The response sheet asked for the total amount to be award-
ed to the plaintiff, how much participants agreed with the assigned plaintiff negligence 
(5-point scale, with 1 being not at all and 5 being completely), and how easy it was to 
determine the damages (5-point scale, with 1 being very hard and 5 being very easy). 
Following the award, there was an open-ended question asking how the par-
ticipant had determined the amount awarded. 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to negligence conditions and tested individ-
ually in groups of up to 25. They were given the packets and told to imagine that they 
were on a real jury that must decide how much money, if any, to award to the plain-
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tiff in a medical malpractice case. Participants were told further that the case involved 
comparative negligence and were given an example of how the damage award is re-
duced by the judge. These instructions were both written for the participants and read 
to them by the experimenter. They then read the case summary and decided on the 
amount to be awarded. The total procedure took about 20 min to complete. 
Results 
Two participants’ data were removed for failure to follow instructions, and 4 
other participants were removed for making nonspecifi c awards (e.g., “the same,” 
“50–75K”), leaving 145 participants for analysis. Because of the high variabili-
ty in the data, the natural log of the damage award was used for analysis (Cather, 
Greene, & Durham, 1996; Chapman & Bornstein, 1996; Moller, 1996,1997; Shan-
ley, 1985; Wissler et al., 1997). The damage awards (as well as agreement and ease 
at determining damages) were analyzed using 3 × 2 between-subjects ANOVAs 
with three levels of plaintiff negligence (0%, 20%, 40%) and two levels of partici-
pant status (students vs. jurors). All tests were conducted with alpha set at .05. 
Damage Awards 
Figure 1 shows the mean damage award for each negligence condition. The main 
effect for negligence was signifi cant, F(2, 139) = 3.07, p < .05. Planned contrasts 
showed that participants awarded more damages in the 0% condition (M = $54,103, 
SD = $52,462) than in the 20% and 40% conditions combined (M = $38,273, SD = 
$18,968), t(142) = 2.36, p = .02, with no difference between the 20% (M = $40,419, 
SD = $19,146) and 40% (M = $36,173, SD = $18,754) conditions, t(142) < 1. Neither 
the main effect for participant status nor, the participant status by negligence interac-
tion was signifi cant, F(1, 139) = 2.76, p = .10, and F(2, 139) < 1, respectively. 
Agreement with Negligence 
As with the damage awards, the main effect for plaintiff negligence was sig-
nifi cant, F(1, 128) = 3.85, p = .02. Participants agreed with the two partial negli-
gence conditions (M = 3.22, SD = 1.27) more than the 0% condition (M = 2.55, 
SD = 1.42), t(131) = 2.77, p < .01, with no difference between the two partial neg-
ligence conditions, t < 1 (20%: M = 3.33, SD = 1.37; 40%: M = 3.11, SD = 1.17). 
Also, as with the damage awards, neither the main effect for participant status nor 
the negligence by participant status interaction was signifi cant, Fs < 1. 
Ease of Determining Damages 
Neither participant status nor degree of negligence affected how easy partici-
pants found it to determine damages (Fs < 2.20, ps > .14). 
Explanation of Damage Award 
Responses to this question were coded according to the strategy participants re-
ported using to determine the damage award. Five categories were used: (1) picked 
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a fair amount without computation, (2) computed some number and left it at that, 
(3) computed a number and then adjusted it, (4) awarded the ad damnum, and (5) 
specifi cally reduced the amount by the level of plaintiff negligence. The fi rst three 
categories were taken from those used by Goodman et al. (1989), while the fourth 
category was based on previous studies that found the ad damnum to be the mod-
al amount awarded (Chapman & Bornstein, 1996; Raitz et al., 1990). The fi nal cate-
gory was established as a manipulation check for the instructions (i.e., those falling 
into this category admittedly failed to follow the instructions). The categories were 
not mutually exclusive. Two raters independently scored these questions, with inter-
rater agreement of 85%. All disagreements were reconciled between the two raters. 
Twenty-fi ve percent of the participants awarded the ad damnum, which was 
the modal amount awarded. Furthermore, as in Goodman et al. (1989), the ma-
jority of participants (62%) reported having computed a number in determining 
damages (50% just computed a number, while 12% computed a number and then 
adjusted it). Finally, 14% of the participants indicated that they considered the 
plaintiff’s negligence in determining the award (all of these participants were in 
the two partial plaintiff negligence conditions). 
Discussion 
The main fi nding from Experiment 1 is that, as predicted, mock jurors re-
turned lower total damage awards to partially negligent plaintiffs than to non-
negligent plaintiffs. This discounting occurred even though (1) mock jurors were 
specifi cally instructed to determine their damage award ignoring any plaintiff 
negligence, and (2) mock jurors tended not to agree with the level of responsibil-
ity assigned to the nonnegligent plaintiff. The implication is that jurors take into 
account liability issues (i.e., the plaintiff’s level of negligence) and reduce the 
damage award when the plaintiff contributes to his own injuries. We suggest that 
this fusion of liability and damages, which ultimately results in doubly discounted 
damage awards, is a consequence of hindsight. 
A second main fi nding from Experiment 1 is that the awards by college stu-
dents did not differ signifi cantly from the awards made by jurors, nor were the 
two groups affected differentially by the level of comparative negligence. This re-
sult supports other fi ndings (e.g., Bornstein, 1999; Bornstein & Rajki, 1994; Cut-
ler, Dexter, & Penrod, 1989) that the use of college students in psycholegal re-
search is not in itself problematic. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Since in Experiment 1 it was found that participants discounted the awards due 
to plaintiff negligence, Experiment 2 explored which components of the award mock 
jurors reduced. Although little or no instructions are given concerning how to deter-
mine the different types of damages, most states do provide some instruction about 
what jurors should consider when determining the damage award (Wissler, Kuehn, 
& Saks, 1998). While the specifi c components that are included, and how well each 
component is defi ned, vary across jurisdictions (Wissler et al., 1998), instructions 
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generally include two types of compensatory damages: economic and noneconomic 
(Cather et al., 1996; Greene & Bornstein, 1998; Wissler et al., 1997,1998). 
Economic, or specifi c, damages refer to the fi nancial costs, both past and fu-
ture, actually incurred (or expected to be incurred) by the plaintiff as a result of 
the injury (Cather et al., 1996; Vidmar, 1995; Wissler et al., 1997). The two most 
commonly reported components of economic damages are medical expenses and 
lost wages (Cather et al., 1996; Vidmar, 1995; Wissler et al., 1997). Noneconom-
ic damages refer to components in which the only basis for determining damag-
es is subjective human judgment (Cather et al., 1996; Vidmar, 1995). Components 
of noneconomic damages fall under two broad categories: pain and suffering, and 
the physical injury suffered (or bodily harm).3 
Both pain and suffering and bodily harm are rather ambiguous, and neither 
is usually specifi cally defi ned. The main difference between the two components 
appears to be that pain and suffering awards are to compensate more for mental 
and emotional consequences such as mental anguish, emotional distress, humilia-
tion, or shock; while damages for bodily harm are to compensate for more visible 
or physical consequences of the injury, such as disability, the loss of use of a body 
part, or disfi gurement (Wissler et al., 1998). 
Without a clear basis for awarding damages, one would expect jurors’ interpre-
tations, and subsequently their awards, to vary greatly (Raitz et al., 1990; Wissler 
et al., 1997,1998). Further, because of this wide variation, ambiguous tasks would 
be more susceptible to subjective infl uences of which jurors are unaware. As indi-
cated above, noneconomic damages are subjective in nature, and the defi nitions of 
their components are highly ambiguous, so one might expect that double discount-
ing would occur more for noneconomic than for economic damages. 
Hammitt et al. (1985), in seeking to explain why damage awards were low-
er for comparative negligence cases (before being reduced by the court), conclud-
ed that “the standard instructions for comparative negligence are clear as written so 
it is more likely that juries give lower estimates for pain and suffering, mental an-
guish, and other intangibles when the plaintiff is in part responsible for the injury” 
(p. 758). We therefore predicted that there would not be any differences due to the 
plaintiff’s negligence for the two economic damages components (medical expens-
es and lost income), but that partially negligent plaintiffs would receive less com-
pensation for the noneconomic components of pain and suffering and bodily harm. 
This prediction was tested in Experiment 2 by having participants award 
damages using a special verdicts form that separated the damage award into four 
components (two economic and two noneconomic). Participants’ explanations in 
Experiment 1 indicated that most determined an award for each suggested catego-
ry (e.g., lost wages) and then added the components together. Nineteen states pro-
vide for the use of special verdict forms in their comparative negligence statutes 
(Schwartz, 1994). While these statutes typically only require the jury to return a 
verdict stating the percentage of negligence of each party and the total amount of 
damages recoverable had the plaintiff not been partly responsible for the injuries 
3 A third category, loss of enjoyment of life, could also have been included. However, since it 
is usually included as a subgroup of pain and suffering, we will not treat it separately here. 
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(Schwartz, 1994), some tort reform statutes (e.g., Florida and New York) also re-
quire the total damage award to be separated into economic and noneconomic 
damages (Schwartz, 1994). 
Experiment 2 also attempted to explore experimentally the fi nding from Exper-
iment 1 that most participants did some sort of computation to arrive at an award. 
Participants were forced either to determine the total damage award fi rst, then divide 
this amount into the individual components (total fi rst), or to determine amounts 
for the individual components before arriving at the total damage award (compo-
nents fi rst). The “components fi rst” condition was designed to force participants to 
do some sort of computation in arriving at the total award. The order manipulation 
also allows for a comparison of different formats of special verdict forms. 
Method 
Participants 
As Experiment 1 failed to fi nd any difference in damage awards between col-
lege students and jurors, only college students participated in Experiment 2. Of 
179 participants, 3 were dropped for failing to follow directions, resulting in 176 
participants for analysis. 
The same demographic information was collected as in Experiment 1. 
Twenty-fi ve percent of participants were male and 78% were White, with a me-
dian age of 20 years. 
Materials and Design 
A 3 × 2 between-subjects design was used, with the same three levels of 
plaintiff negligence as in Experiment 1 (0%, 20%, 40%), and two levels of order 
of response (total fi rst or components fi rst). The same materials were used as in 
Experiment 1, with the slight modifi cation that a second response sheet was add-
ed. For the total fi rst condition, the fi rst response sheet remained the same as in 
Experiment 1, while the second response sheet contained a list of categories to 
consider in determining the award. These were (1) the physical injury suffered 
(i.e., bodily harm), (2) pain and suffering, both physical and emotional, (3) lost 
earnings, and (4) medical expenses. Participants only went to the second response 
sheet after they had completed the fi rst response sheet. For the components fi rst 
condition, the order of the response sheets was reversed. All participants were 
then asked how they had determined damages. 
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, with the added verbal in-
struction not to go to the next page until having completed each page. This in-
struction ensured that participants were forced to commit to an amount for the 
appropriate method (total fi rst or components fi rst) before determining the other 
types of awards. 
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Results 
As in Experiment 1, the natural log of the total damage award, agreement 
with plaintiff negligence, and ease of determining damages were analyzed in 3 × 
2 ANOVAs, with plaintiff negligence and order of response as between-subjects 
factors. In addition, the natural log of each of the four components was analyzed 
using a MANOVA with negligence and order as between-subjects factors. 
Total Damage Awards 
Supporting the fi ndings from Experiment 1, the effect of plaintiff negligence 
was marginally signifi cant, F(2,164) =2.67, p = .07 (see Fig. 1). Planned compar-
isons replicated Experiment 1, indicating that participants awarded signifi cantly 
more for the 0% plaintiff negligence condition (M = $43,503, SD = $12,069) than 
for the two partial plaintiff negligence conditions (M = $38,818, SD = $12,954), 
t(167) = 2.29, p = .02, with no difference between the 20% (M = $39,213, SD = 
$12,521) and 40% (M = $38,403, SD = $13,502) plaintiff negligence conditions, 
t(167) < 1. Neither the main effect for order of response nor the negligence by or-
der interaction was signifi cant, Fs < 1. 
Agreement with Negligence 
Supporting the fi ndings from Experiment 1, the effect of plaintiff negligence 
was marginally signifi cant, F(2, 160) = 2.56, p = .08. The planned comparisons 
indicated that participants in the partial plaintiff negligence conditions (M = 3.39, 
SD = 0.98) agreed with the negligence assigned signifi cantly more than those in 
the 0% plaintiff negligence condition (M = 3.00, SD = 1.36), t(163) = 2.11, p < 
.05, with no signifi cant difference between the 20% (M = 3.28, SD = 1.05) and 
40% (M = 3.50, SD = 0.91) plaintiff negligence conditions, t(163) = 1.03, p > .3. 
Neither the main effect for order of response nor the negligence by order interac-
tion was signifi cant, Fs < 1.69, ps > .20. 
Ease of Determining Damages 
As in Experiment 1, neither the main effect for plaintiff negligence nor the neg-
ligence by order interaction was signifi cant for the ease of determining damages, 
Fs < 1. However, the main effect for order of response was signifi cant, F(l, 160) = 
3.76, p = .05, with participants fi nding it easier to determine the total award fi rst (M 
= 3.20, SD = 1.04) than to determine the components fi rst (M = 2.86, SD = 1.17). 
Components of Damage Awards 
The largest awards were for medical expenses (M = $16,773, SD = $8,282), fol-
lowed by bodily harm (M = $10,075, SD = $7,079), pain and suffering (M = 
$9,279, SD = $6,847), and then lost wages (M = $4,402, SD = $3,822). Because the 
components were all signifi cantly intercorrelated, a multivariate analysis was con-
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ducted with level of plaintiff negligence and order of response as between-subjects 
factors. Using Wilks’ lambda, the multivariate test was signifi cant for negligence, 
F(8) = 2.27, p = .02, but not for order or the negligence by order interaction, Fs < 1. 
using the univariate tests, negligence had a signifi cant effect only on the award for 
bodily harm, F(2, 140) = 3.11, p < .05. The same planned comparisons were car-
ried out as for the total award and showed that participants awarded less to partially 
negligent plaintiffs (M = $9,382, SD = $6,954) than to nonnegligent plaintiffs (M = 
$11,473, SD = $7,184), t(155) = 2.35, p < .05, with no difference between the two 
partial negligence conditions (20%: M = $10,184, SD = $7,660; 40%: M = $8,535, 
SD = $6,079), t(155) = 1.46, p = .15. No other main effects or interactions were sig-
nifi cant for any of the other components, Fs < 2.19, ps > .10. 
Explanation of Damage Awards 
The open-ended question was scored the same as in Experiment 1, with interra-
ter agreement of 87%. Twenty-four percent of participants awarded the ad damnum, 
which was the modal amount awarded. Again, the majority of participants (78%) 
reported computing a number in determining damages (66% just computed a num-
ber, and 12% computed a number and then adjusted it). Finally, 11% of the partici-
pants specifi cally indicated that they considered the plaintiff’s negligence in deter-
mining the damage award (all of these participants were in the two partial plaintiff 
negligence conditions). These fi gures are similar to those of Experiment 1. 
Discussion 
The main result of Experiment 2 was the replication of the double discount-
ing of partially negligent plaintiffs’ total damage award. Also, as in Experiment 
1, no difference was found between the 20% and 40% plaintiff negligence condi-
tions, indicating that the degree of double discounting was not dependent on the 
specifi c level of the plaintiff’s partial negligence. 
The second main fi nding is that the reductions in the total damage awards due 
to plaintiff negligence refl ected reductions only in the damage awards for the plain-
tiff’s bodily harm. This fi nding partially supports the claim by Hammitt et al. (1985) 
that adjustments by jurors would be made in the less tangible components of the 
award. We suggest that the reductions were not merely due to the absence of a spe-
cifi c anchor for bodily harm, as the awards for pain and suffering, which also did 
not have a specifi c anchor, were not reduced. Wissler et al. (1997) also failed to fi nd 
differences in damage awards for pain and suffering due to the level of plaintiff neg-
ligence. However, their pain and suffering award included consideration of bodily 
harm. Thus, our results are neither clearly supportive nor contrary to their fi ndings. 
The third main fi nding is that most participants computed damages rath-
er than just picked a fair amount. The vast majority of participants, in both 
the total-fi rst and the components-fi rst conditions, reported having determined 
amounts for the various components prior to arriving at a total amount. This 
lack of a difference in award amounts due to the order of determining the dam-
age awards suggests that imposing a strategy upon the participants (i.e., award-
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ing component amounts fi rst) is consistent with the strategy that they devel-
oped and used on their own (i.e., in the total-fi rst condition). Thus, while there 
are other ways to calculate damages than simply adding up the specifi ed com-
ponents, the current fi ndings suggest that most participants computed damages 
by considering and then summing the discrete components. Additional evidence 
for participants doing some sort of computation emerges from the observation 
that many component awards were amounts that could be easily calculated from 
the information provided in the case summary. 
Finally, participants perceived the task of determining damages as easier in 
the total-fi rst condition than in the components-fi rst condition, suggesting that 
they preferred their naive computational strategies to the formal strategy imposed 
by the requirement to award components fi rst. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The main fi nding from both experiments is that participants returned lower dam-
age awards for partially negligent plaintiffs than for nonnegligent plaintiffs. Because 
these damage awards are then reduced by the court in accordance with the level of 
the plaintiff’s negligence, the fi nal award received by the plaintiff would be reduced 
twice, or doubly discounted. This fi nding of double discounting is consistent with 
both archival (Hammitt et al., 1985; Shanley, 1985) and experimental (Feigenson et 
al., 1997; Thomas & Parpal, 1987) studies that have found lower gross awards for 
partially negligent plaintiffs. A second major fi nding was that the reduction in damage 
awards for partially negligent plaintiffs was refl ected only in the amount awarded for 
bodily harm, lending partial support to the claim by Hammitt et al. (1985) that reduc-
tions would occur in damages awarded for relatively less tangible components. 
Another main fi nding from Experiment 1 was the failure to fi nd differences 
in the damage awards between college students and people who had been called 
for jury duty. This fi nding supports previous research which has generally failed 
to fi nd differences between participant samples in both criminal (e.g., Cutler et al., 
1989; MacCoun & Kerr, 1988) and civil (e.g., Bornstein & Rajki, 1994; Casper et 
al., 1989) cases. While this fi nding is not new, it does provide additional evidence 
from civil cases, which to a large extent has been lacking (Bornstein, 1999). 
The fi nal fi nding of importance concerns the process by which participants de-
termined damage awards. Critics of juries claim damage awards are determined ar-
bitrarily and/or based on emotion (see Litan, 1993, and Vidmar, 1995, for reviews). 
However, the present experiments, as well as others (Cather et al., 1996; Goodman 
et al., 1989; Greene, 1989; Raitz et al., 1990), indicate that most jurors performed 
computations in order to determine their awards, even when instructions encour-
aged them to do it holistically (i.e., the total-fi rst condition in Experiment 2). 
Discounting, Fusion, and Hindsight 
Jurors in a comparative negligence case are faced with an extremely diffi cult 
task. Not only must they decide if the defendant was negligent, but they must also 
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decide how much, if any, the plaintiff contributed to his or her own injuries. Then, if 
the level of the plaintiff’s negligence allows for recovery, the jurors must determine 
a damage award that compensates fairly, based on instructions that provide little 
guidance (Wissler et al., 1998). Subsequently, jurors are required to consider a great 
deal of information concerning events with which they have little or no expertise. 
Because of the amount and complexity of this information, jurors are likely to rely 
on cognitive heuristics when reaching their decisions (Arkes, 1989; Chapman & 
Bornstein, 1996; Saks & Kidd, 1980). A common consequence of using heuristics is 
that the decisions are subject to systematic biases (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974). 
One such bias that could be used as a framework to explain why damage 
awards to partially negligent plaintiffs are reduced is hindsight (Christensen-Sza-
lanski & Willham, 1991; Fischhoff, 1975; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). According 
to this reasoning, once participants knew the outcome information-that is, that the 
plaintiff was partially negligent-they were unable to ignore that information in de-
termining the damage award, even when instructed to do so by the judge. This in-
ability to ignore information about partial negligence led them to fuse information 
about liability with their judgment about damages. 
The trial situation may be especially susceptible to hindsight effects because 
of the diffi culty and unfamiliarity of the tasks that jurors are expected to perform 
(i.e., determining liability and awarding damages). The effect size of the hindsight 
bias has been shown to be larger, the less familiar one is with the task (Chris-
tensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). Hawkins and Has-
tie (1990) included situations involving the misapplication of jury instructions in 
their review of the hindsight bias, stating that such situations involve similar un-
derlying psychological mechanisms. 
One condition of the hindsight bias is a denial that the outcome information 
infl uenced one’s judgment (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). Our data are consistent 
with this condition, in that only a small proportion of participants (14% in Exper-
iment 1 and 11% in Experiment 2) reported having been infl uenced by the level 
of the plaintiff’s negligence when they determined the award. It has been argued 
that people, including judges (Ebbesen & Konecni, 1975), may not be able to re-
port accurately the factors that infl uence their decision making (Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977). Indeed, evidence that a much larger percentage of participants did not ig-
nore the plaintiff’s negligence comes from the observation that those who did not 
acknowledge its infl uence discounted their awards just as much as those who did. 
This fi nding suggests that although the majority of participants were infl uenced 
by the plaintiff’s degree of negligence, they were unaware of it. Further research 
is needed that includes a direct measure of comprehension of the judge’s instruc-
tions and focuses on the intentionality of discounting. 
Policy Implications 
The fi nding that mock jurors discount plaintiffs’ gross awards according to 
their degree of negligence is consistent with previous research showing that jurors 
tend to fuse liability judgments and damage awards (Bornstein, 1998; Feigenson 
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et al., 1997; MacCoun, 1993) and, in general, have a hard time applying legal in-
structions as they are intended (e.g., Thompson et al., 1981; Wissler et al., 1998). 
While some may claim that this discounting is acceptable because juries are sup-
posed to refl ect the consciousness of society and inject common sense into the le-
gal process (Finkel, 1995), others may fi nd it to be excessive. 
Tort reform proponents have often claimed that juries are irrational, gullible, 
out of control, and affected too much by sympathy (for reviews, see Litan, 1993, 
and Vidmar, 1995). Thus they have proposed a number of reforms either to re-
move the jury from the decision-making process or at least to restrict their op-
tions. These reforms include the use of special verdict forms, capping damage 
awards, instituting bifurcated trials, and even replacing juries in medical mal-
practice cases with professional review boards (Daniels & Martin, 1986; Greene, 
1989; MacCoun, 1993; Vidmar, 1995; Wiggins & Breckler, 1990). 
However, in opposition to these claims, Vidmar (1995) found little evidence sup-
porting the contention that jurors are biased against malpractice defendants. The pres-
ent fi nding—that double discounting occurs in malpractice cases involving com-
parative negligence—supports Vidmar’s conclusions, as double discounting can be 
construed as an antiplaintiff, not an antidefendant, effect (Feigenson et al., 1997). 
The methodology employed in the current studies differs from previous stud-
ies on comparative negligence (Feigenson et al., 1997; Thomas & Parpal, 1987) in 
that participants only determined damages. Not only does this procedure allow for 
the direct manipulation of the specifi c amount of negligence attributed to the plain-
tiff, it also provides a framework for examining the effectiveness of bifurcated tri-
als. In a bifurcated trial, the jury initially considers only liability; then, if liabili-
ty has been established, a second phase occurs in which a jury (either the same or 
a different one) is presented with information relevant only to damages (Horowitz 
& Bordens, 1990). It is likely that determining both liability and damages would 
make the plaintiff’s level of negligence more salient, thereby resulting in even 
greater discounting of the awards than when jurors award damages only. Although 
such a prediction is speculative, our fi ndings suggest that bifurcation would not 
eliminate the double discounting of damage awards for partially negligent plain-
tiffs unless the second phase were completed by a new jury that was blindfolded to 
the plaintiff’s liability. Blindfolding the jury to some issue is not uncommon (Dia-
mond & Casper, 1992), and it is sometimes used concerning the maximum level of 
plaintiff negligence that still allows for recovery (Schwartz, 1994). 
Another reform that has been suggested is the use of special verdicts requir-
ing the jury to respond to each contested issue (Vidmar, 1995; Wiggins & Breck-
ler, 1990). These special verdicts often require the jury to spell out the amounts 
awarded for the various types of economic and noneconomic damages. The use 
of special verdicts can aid in the judicial review of a case (MacCoun, 1993). By 
separating each damage issue, the judge can determine its appropriateness much 
more easily than if a general verdict is used. For example, if some type of dam-
age award has been capped (e.g., pain and suffering), a special verdict enables the 
judge to determine easily if the jury awarded more than the cap allows. Such judg-
ments are diffi cult, if not impossible, to make if only a general verdict is used. Al-
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though we did not directly compare awards made using a special verdict form to 
those using a general verdict form, the results of Experiment 2 can be used to ad-
dress the format of special verdict forms. We failed to fi nd differences in the dam-
age awards due to the order in which damages were determined (total or compo-
nents fi rst), but participants reported fi nding it easier to determine damages in the 
total-fi rst condition. Thus, providing jurors with a special verdict form requesting 
a total damage award prior to one for each component will be easier on the jurors 
without affecting the amount of damages awarded. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
A limitation of the current studies is that participants did not deliberate. How-
ever, since the same results concerning double discounting have also been found 
in archival studies (e.g., Shanley, 1985), it seems unlikely that deliberation would 
produce different results from those obtained from individuals. On the other hand, 
Guinther (1988) found that during deliberations, damage awards may become a 
bartering tool that allows a compromise between the majority and minority views. 
Thus, it is possible that during deliberations in a comparative negligence case, the 
level of the plaintiffs negligence could be used as a reason to raise or lower the 
damage award in order to get agreement by the jurors. Jurors might also trade off 
the percentage of negligence assessed for the amount awarded. Future studies in-
volving deliberation are needed in order to solidify the generality of these effects. 
Future studies are also needed that examine a wider range of plaintiff neg-
ligence levels. Although we found that the specifi c level of plaintiff negligence 
did not differentially affect the damage awards, our levels of plaintiff negligence 
(20% vs. 40%) may not have been sensitive enough to produce a difference. Fur-
thermore, because participants were informed of the plaintiff’s level of respon-
sibility rather than determining it for themselves, the specifi c level of the plain-
tiff’s negligence given may not have been salient enough. As such, jurors may 
have treated that information in more of an all-or-none manner; that is, they were 
more concerned with whether the plaintiff contributed to his injuries at all than 
the exact amount contributed. Future studies examining plaintiff negligence lev-
els should include conditions of slight plaintiff negligence (e.g., 5% or less), as 
well as when the plaintiff’s negligence is greater than that of the defendant. 
Finally, because of the costs associated with implementing bifurcated trials 
for comparative negligence cases, research on ways to reduce double discounting 
would be benefi cial. The hindsight bias has been resistant to attempts to eliminate 
it (Fischhoff, 1975; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990), including instructing jurors to ignore 
some information (Casper et al., 1989; Thompson et al., 1981). However, strong 
countervailing instructions indicating that the outcome information was mistaken 
have been shown to eliminate the effects of hindsight for retrospective confi dence 
ratings concerning almanac questions (Hasher, Attig, & Alba, 1981). While this so-
lution would not be feasible in a trial situation, there has been some evidence that 
instructions to reconsider the nonreported outcomes can reduce the hindsight effect 
(Slovic & Fischhoff, 1977). This fi nding could be used to develop more explicit in-
structions concerning the role of hindsight in jurors’ decision making. 
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